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Henry Simons and the other Minsky Moment*
JAN TOPOROWSKI**
This paper examines the influence of Henry Simons on Hyman Minsky.
Simons’ proposals for banking reform are contrasted with Minsky's alterna-
tive ‘big bank’ and ‘big government’ programme for stabilising the economy.
The paper concludes by arguing that Simons’ proposals for stabilising bank-
ing would have prevented a credit bubble, but would not avoid economic
instability. Nevertheless, Minsky remained an admirer of ‘Simons’ banking’
approach to the study of capitalism.
(J.E.L.: B31; E44; E58; G21)
1. Henry Simons: The other influence on Minsky
The origins of Minsky’s ideas in the work of John Maynard Keynes, and
Minsky’s own rather idiosyncratic interpretation of Keynes are well known
(Minsky 1975). But in his Ph.D. thesis, Minsky made relatively few refer-
ences to Keynes, and they are mainly the predictable ones: Keynes on uncer-
tainty, consumption, liquidity preference and the liquidity trap (Minsky
1954/2004). All of these references are to the General Theory, and none show
the insights into Keynes’ work that were to be developed in Minsky’s John
Maynard Keynes (1975). In that doctoral thesis, another later influence, the
Polish business cycle theorist Michal Kalecki, has his Principle of Increasing
Risk correctly cited as a theory of the size of firms. However, Kalecki’s inter-
nal finance constraint on investment, which came to have a central role in
Minsky’s analysis after he returned in 1970 from his year in Cambridge, UK,
is mistakenly attributed to the monetary business theorist Ralph Hawtrey fol-
lowing a citation from the econometrician Sho-Chieh Tsiang (Minsky
1954/2004:72). However, the economist who arguably directed Minsky
towards the macroeconomics of financial disturbance, the Chicago liberal
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Henry Simons, is not mentioned at all in Minsky’s doctoral thesis.
This is a most surprising omission. Simons had taught Minsky at Chicago.
In his later memoir of his Chicago years, published in the Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro Quarterly Review in 1986, Minsky recalled the very personal rela-
tionship that he had with Simons.
It was Simons who introduced Minsky to the idea that the financial sys-
tem in the USA was structurally flawed and who explained how the banking
system had contributed to the Great Depression, without resorting to tales
about incorrect monetary policy, or imbalances between saving and invest-
ment. When Minsky finished his military service in 1946, he was offered a
generous fellowship to return to Chicago, but turned it down for a less lucra-
tive studentship at Harvard. His reason was that the three economists whom
he most admired at Chicago were no longer there: Viner had gone to
Princeton; Lange, whose socialist commitment had inspired Minsky to study
economics had, to Minsky’s disgust, thrown in his lot with the Polish
Communists; and Simons was dead (Minsky 1988). Simons, who was prone
to melancholy, had committed suicide in despair at the onset of
Keynesianism. Six years before he wrote his memoir, in his Preface to his
1982 volume of essays, Minsky had mentioned Simons even ahead of Lange
and Schumpeter, as an influence: “As a student, I was most influenced by
Henry C. Simons, Oscar Lange, and Josef Schumpeter” (Minsky 1982: 5).
2. Simons and Banking Reform
Simons deserves consideration not only because Minsky appears so inex-
plicably to have omitted him from his thesis. Such consideration is further
justified because many of those who have heard of him today know him from
the very partial account of his work given by Milton Friedman. Hayek was
later to suggest that Simons shared Hawtrey’s views on the monetary busi-
ness cycle (see below), and there is no doubt that Simons was a theorist of
critical finance in the special sense that he argued that the real economy is
vulnerable to crises emanating from the financial system (Toporowski 2005:
2-5. Due to pressure to complete my own Theories of Financial Disturbance
Simons was, unfortunately, omitted from that book). But, whereas Hawtrey
stressed the natural instability of credit as a factor in business cycles, Simons
argued that the structure of the financial system was a key factor in exacer-
bating disequilibrium in the non-financial sector of the economy. In his clas-
sic article “Rules versus authorities in monetary policy” published in the
Journal of Political Economy in 1936, the late-twentieth century discussion
on central bank independence appears turned on its head. Simons argued that
the regulation of liquidity in the financial system necessitates the absorption
of central banking into the Treasury (finance ministry) function of the gov-
ernment.
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Sensible to the financial debauchery and collapse of the first four decades
of the twentieth century in the USA, Simons was a strong critic of the kind
of financial entrepreneurship that Minsky later also criticised. Simons
believed that such entrepreneurship was the result of liberal banking policies
that encouraged excessive credit and discouraged investment by requiring
business to keep liquidity tied up against a possible inability to roll over
short-term loans. Simons concluded that financial intermediation needs to be
subject to strict rules, and that the fiscal authorities need to have discretion
over monetary policy in order to be able to regulate credit. This discretion
had to be with the fiscal authorities because their open market operations
determine the reserves of the banking system (Simons 1936). Simons had
even argued for the abolition of central banking, because he believed that its
functions are more effectively carried out by government treasuries. The
elimination of central banking also followed from his adherence to the doc-
trine of full reserve (100% reserve) banking. If banks are obliged to hold the
equivalent of all their deposits as reserves, then there is clearly no need for
provision of reserves by a central bank (The discussion around this is per-
ceptively examined by Ronnie J. Phillips in a book, The Chicago Plan and
New Deal Banking Reform, to which Minsky wrote a Preface; Phillips 1995).
After the publication of his monetary history of the USA, Milton
Friedman gave the critical reassessment of Simons referred to above.
Friedman argued that Simons had failed to realise the disastrous conse-
quences of the contraction of bank credit in 1930-3, which Friedman revealed
in his history. In fact, Simons could not have been unaware of the contrac-
tion: Irving Fisher had been arguing much the same around 1933 and both
Fisher and Simons were involved in the discussions around the reform of the
Federal Reserve System to stabilise the faltering US banking system (Phillips
1995, ch. 3-4).
However, Friedman drew a conclusion that was directly contrary to that
of Simons. In Friedman’s view, consistently argued since 1948, the monetary
authorities, rather than banks, had to be bound by rules on credit expansion
because, according to Friedman, the relationship between reserves and cred-
it is essentially stable (Friedman: 1967). It goes almost without saying that,
in the monetarist analysis, the relationship between financial intermediation
and the real economy is essentially benign and speculation results from loose
monetary policy rather than loose banking. Friedman’s claim, that these doc-
trines were part of the “oral tradition” of Chicago, had already drawn
Patinkin’s famous defence of a broader tradition at Chicago (Patinkin 1961).
Simons was therefore the missing link between Hawtrey and Minsky.
Hayek hinted at this in criticising Friedman’s suggestion that the Great
Depression predisposed both Keynes and Simons to fiscal activism. Simons’
fiscal schemes were explicitly designed to regulate the liquidity of the finan-
cial system, rather than regulating aggregate demand (Simons 1942). Hayek
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wrote to Friedman: “I believe you are wrong in suggesting that the common
element in the doctrines of Simons and Keynes was the influence of the Great
Depression. We all held similar ideas in the 1920s. They had been most fully
elaborated by R.G. Hawtrey who was all the time talking about the ‘inherent
instability of credit’ but he was by no means the only one...” (Friedman 1967:
88).
Minsky, like Patinkin, objected to Friedman’s narrow interpretation of the
Chicago tradition. In a 1969 paper in the Journal of Finance Minsky con-
trasted Simons’ view that the “...depression-proof good financial society
requires the radical restructuring of the financial system...” with Friedman’s
view that “the establishment of the good financial society requires only the
adoption of a stable money growth rule by the Federal Reserve System, given
that the reform represented by the introduction of deposit insurance had
already taken place... Simons had a financial system rather than a narrow
monetary view of the “Banking’s problem” (Minsky 1982: 279/289).
3. Minsky, Simons and the Stability of Capitalism
An essential difference between Simons and Minsky arises over the ques-
tion of the inherent stability of capitalism. Simons believed that the capitalist
market system was stable and self-adjusting, at least in the sense that a
“largely competitive, free market, free-enterprise system” could be stabilised
providing that the government was able to manage the reserves of the bank-
ing system and provide sufficient purchasing power in those capitalist mar-
kets. In particular, in an article published in 1944, Simons argued that com-
petitive markets were inherently stable. “...General and acute instability is, on
any soundly reasoned analysis, primarily attributable to faulty monetary
institutions and, in the broadest sense, to unfortunate fiscal policy”. (Simons
1944: 107-8). This is the fundamental premise of economic and monetary
policy in the U.S. and U.K. following the crisis of 2007-2008.
The Minsky view was much more radical. Capitalism is unstable not just
because of “faulty monetary institutions” and inappropriate government pol-
icy (see Vercelli 2001). From the 1970s onwards Minsky attributed instabili-
ty explicitly to the cyclical shifts in non-financial business investment. Firms
indebt themselves in order to finance their investment, and, in rather approx-
imate accordance with Kalecki’s theory of profits, investment is necessary to
generate the revenues necessary to service debts. The failure of investment to
rise sufficiently to provide the financial surpluses necessary to service grow-
ing corporate debt gives rise to the financial crisis of which Minsky wrote.
His “financial” crises were therefore industrial crises precipitated by rising
indebtedness, rather than bank illiquidity (Minsky 1978). (In this regard,
Minsky overlooked the monetary implication of Kalecki’s theory, namely
that investment above the level of household saving leads to the accumula-
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tion of credit balances on the accounts of nonfinancial enterprises. See
Steindl 1982 and Toporowski 2008).
This has radical implications for economic policy. Stabilising a banking
system without stabilising the industrial and commercial system which those
banks serve, leaves the economy still vulnerable to non-financial business
fluctuations. Non-financial instability in turn renders financial regulation vul-
nerable to arguments from bankers and economists to the effect that if only
the regulations were made lighter, or even removed altogether, the credit sys-
tem would automatically alleviate those imbalances, and bring the economy-
back to equilibrium. And only the ignorant could dismiss such a plea, since
we all teach our students that the credit system functions to accommodate
economic imbalances and has done so quite effectively for decades with only
recent disastrous results. The radical conclusion of Minsky’s work (“big bank
and big government”, Minsky 1986) is based on a fundamental insight of
business cycle theory, rather than just banking economics, namely that with-
out stabilising the economy at large, banking stabilisation is unlikely to hold.
This is an implicit criticism of Minsky’s teacher, Simons, for whom the free
market in exchange with a stabilised banking system is a guarantee of equi-
librium.
Nevertheless, Minsky retained an admiration for Simons and his teacher’s
belief that the destabilising influence in capitalism is banking rather than, as
Chicago later convinced itself, government policy. In his most important and
developed exposition of his theory, Minsky declared the writings of Simons,
along with Keynes’s General Theory and Fisher’s debt deflation analysis, as
providing “the fundamentals of a theory of financial instability” (Minsky
1986: 172). He commended Simons’ “serious conservative program of insti-
tutional reform and policy operation that remains a model of political econo-
my” and concluded: “In spite of the passage of fifty years, the substance of
Simons’ proposals are still worth considering” (Minsky 1986: 9). Even
though Simons’ ferocious opposition to Keynesianism repelled Minsky, he
still admired the brio with which Simons put forward his critique of the
American Keynesian Alvin Hansen (Simons 1942). This critique, Minsky
wrote, “can be read with pleasure for both its rather unfair attacking style and
as a sophisticated attack on the interventionist economy.” (Minsky 1986:
122). The seriousness and sophistication that Minsky found in Simons quite
evidently arose because he recognised that Simons had integrated banking
and credit into his economic analysis and was prepared to treat it critically,
instead of just taking it for granted. For this reason Minsky was prepared to
give Simons the critical attention that he gave also to Keynes and Fisher, but
which he would not give to Samuelson, Tobin, Hicks or Milton Friedman.
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